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Abstract—In large-scale networks, agents (e.g., sensors and
actuators) and links (e.g., couplings and communication links)
can fail or be (cyber-)attacked. In this paper, we focus on
continuous-time bilinear networks, where additive disturbances
model attack/uncertainty on agents/states (a.k.a. node distur-
bances) and multiplicative disturbances model attack/uncertainty
on couplings between agents/states (a.k.a. link disturbances). We
then investigate a network robustness notion in terms of the
underlying digraph of the network, and structure of exogenous
uncertainties/attacks. Specifically, we define the robustness mea-
sure using the H2-norm of the network and calculate it in
terms of the reachability Gramian of the bilinear system. The
main result shows that under certain conditions, the measure
is supermodular over the set of all possible attacked links. The
supermodular property facilitates the efficient solution finding
of the optimization problem. We conclude the paper with a
few examples illustrating how different structures can make the
system more or less vulnerable to malicious attacks on links and
present our concluding remarks.
Index Terms—Bilinear Networks, Adversarial Attacks, Robust-
ness Measures, Supermodular Optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
The robustness of control systems against adversarial attacks
is crucial for sustainability, from engineering infrastructures to
living cells. Often, however, control engineers and researchers
face the duality between the usefulness of the consolidated
theory of linear systems and the more faithful modeling
capability of nonlinear systems. Bilinear dynamical systems
offer an interesting middle-ground, with the substantial theory
developed while still capable of being better than linear
systems at modeling real-world dynamics. In different works
in the literature (see [1]–[3]), we can see its applications on
problems ranging from electrical networks, surface vehicles,
and immunology.
In particular, robustness to external attack is an issue much
studied in the linear systems and the networks literature [4]–
[7], mainly by investigating how exogenous additive distur-
bances can affect overall performance. However, for nonlinear
systems the problem is notoriously difficult to solve. In this pa-
per, we focus on a class of continuous-time nonlinear networks
(bilinear dynamical systems), and we formulate the problem
of attacking a network through multiplicative disturbances on
its edges as an optimization problem. Specifically, the goal
is to maximize the H2 norm of the system while balancing a
constant cost for attacking more edges. This can be considered
as finding the Achilles’ heel in bilinear dynamical networks
under cyber-attacks. In order to solve that problem, we first
show that under some conditions the H2 norm of a bilinear
system is supermodular on the power set of the vulnerable
edges, which translates the intuitive notion that attacks act
in synergy and are more effective together than individually
applied.
The robustness and performance analysis of linear consen-
sus networks subject to external stochastic disturbances has
been studied in [8]–[10] and references therein, where the H2-
norm of the system was employed as a scalar performance
metric. Supermodularity of a number of control objectives for
linear time-invariant (LTI) systems was studied in [11], [12].
Specifically, one of the control objectives is the trace of the
inverse of the controllability Gramian, which one may interpret
as the average control energy. In [13], the author rigorously
proves that average control energy is not always supermodular
for LTI systems, contrary to what is claimed in [11], [12], [14].
In [15], a subclass of differentiable systemic performance mea-
sures that are indeed supermodular is demonstrated. Gramian-
based reachability metrics for discrete-time bilinear systems
are considered in [16]. It is shown that the minimum input
energy to steer the state from the origin to any reachable target
state can be lower bounded by a Gramian-based reachability
metric [16].
This work is divided as follows: in section II we establish
notation and definitions used to show our main result, and we
also formally define the structure considered for the bilinear
system and network; in section III we present our main
theoretical result, showing the supermodularity of the H2
norm of the bilinear system when increasing the number of
attacked edges; in section IV we show how knowledge of
the H2 norm of the system can help to target the protection
of vulnerable edges, and show how our attack formulation
can help with that process for extensive systems; and finally,
section V concludes our work and makes brief remarks about
other potential problems where our main result might also be
useful.
II. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
A. Notation and Assumptions
Throughout the paper, the set of real numbers, non-negative
real numbers and strictly positive real numbers are represented
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as R, R+ and R++, respectivelly. Similarly, the set of the
strictly positive integers is denoted by N and the set of strictly
positive integers up to m by N≤m. Matrices are represented
by uppercase letters and for a given matrix Nk, its element
in row i and column j is represented as nijk . Furthermore,
we use the notation Nk = (nk(i, j))ij whenever we want to
bring attention to the expression of the individual elements of
the matrix Nk instead of the matrix itself, and for any square
matrix M ∈ Rn×n let the operator trace(·) : Rn×n → R be∑n
k=1m
kk, the sum of the elements of the main diagonal of
M . For any finite set of elements V , let |V| ∈ N∪ {0} be the
number of elements in the set with |V| = 0 ⇐⇒ V = ∅, and
let 2V be the powerset of V . Furthermore, for any function
f with domain in V , for each subset V¯ ⊂ V define f(V¯) =
{f(v) | v ∈ V¯}.
Finally, consider the following definition
Definition (Bilinear Digraph). A bilinear digraph is a quintet
G := (V, E , w, Ea,Va) where V ⊂ N is called a node set,
E ⊆ V×V is called an edge set, Va ⊆ V is called an attacked
node set, Ea ⊆ V × V is called an attacked edge set, and
w : E → R is a weight function.
B. Bilinear Systems and Digraphs
We consider a class of nonlinear systems associated with
bilinear digraphs that consist of multiple agents with scalar
state variables xi, node inputs vi, and link inputs ηk. We
assume that the closed-loop dynamics of the network can be
written in the following compact form
Σ :
x˙ = (N0 +
m∑
k=1
ηkNk)x+Bv
y = Cx
(1)
where the total number of nodes/agents is n, x ∈ Rn is the
state vector, y is the output, the number of nodes/agents under
attack is m¯, the number of edges/couplings under attack is
m, vector v = [v1; · · · ; vm¯] is the node disturbance/input and
vector η = [η1; · · · ; ηm] is the link disturbance/input. 1 Matrix
N0 ∈ Rn×n is called the drift matrix and is the adjacency
matrix of the linear subgraph (V, E , w) and represents the
system’s dynamics if not under attack. The input matrix B
is the column composition of the elementary vectors ej for
every j ∈ Va, and each of the coupling matrices Nk are
defined as Nk = Eik,jk (being Eij the elementary matrix with
a nonzero element in the position of line i and column j and
zero everywhere else) for all (ik, jk) ∈ Ea. We assume that
the attacked edges are independently disturbed by a signal η.
With this definition consider: the isomorphism h : N→ Ea
that enumerates the edges in an arbitrary manner; the notation
h(k) = (ik, jk), ∀k in the domain of h(·); and the abuse
of notation k ∈ Ea as a k in the domain of h(·), such that
1In this paper, we consider independent disturbances on each attacked node
and edge; however, the results from Theorems 1 and 2 hold for a more general
case where the same input vector affects nodes and links (i.e., η = v ) as
long as the coupling matrices are still elementary matrices.
h(k) ∈ Ea. With this we can rewrite equation (1) in a more
general form as
Σ :
x˙ = (N0 +
∑
k∈Ea
ηkNk)x+Bv
y = Cx
(2)
and η = {ηk | k ∈ Ea}. Whenever required in this paper we
assume the outputs of system as being all the states which
means C = In, where In is the n × n identity matrix.
Finally, we also assume that all the disturbances are bounded
in magnitude by some M > 0, that is ηk ≤ M , ∀k ∈ Ea and
vk ≤M , ∀k ∈ Va.
Finally, we introduce the family of bilinear digraphs F
obtained from a ground set of vulnerable edges Ev ⊆ V × V ,
consisting of all graphs that share the same set of nodes V ,
of edges E , the same weights w, the same sets of attacked
nodes Va and that have a set attacked edges Ea ⊆ Ev .
This definition becomes useful when considering the cost for
attacking different edges and deciding which ones to attack.
III. H2 BASED PERFORMANCE MEASURE AND ITS
PROPERTIES
In this section we first define a robustness measure to
quantify the vulnerability of a system given by equation (2)
against attacks on its links. For linear systems it is shown that
the H2 norm is an effective robustness metric [8]–[10] which
makes it appropriate for measuring the vulnerability to external
attacks. We then investigate some properties of the H2 norm
for a class of bilinear systems. It is shown that the H2 norm
of these systems can be interpreted as the convolution kernel
energy (a.k.a. Volterra kernel energy) [17], [18].
A. Reachability Gramian of Bilinear Systems
For bilinear system (2), a generalized Lyapunov equation is
given by
N0P + PN
>
0 +
∑
k∈Ea
NkPN
>
k +BB
> = 0 (3)
where P is called the reachability Gramian of the bilinear sys-
tem (2). Throughout this paper we assume that the following
assumption holds.
Assumption 1. Assume N0 is stable and for some α and β
that respect the inequality ||eN0t|| ≤ βe−αt for all t > 0, we
have
√∑
k∈Ea ||NkN>k || < α/(Mβ).
The following theorem shows how the H2 norm of a class
of bilinear systems can be calculated using the solution of the
generalized Lyapunov equation (3).
Theorem 1 ( [18] ). Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then the
input-state H2 norm of bilinear system (2) is given by
||Σ||2 =
√
trace(P ),
where the reachability Gramian P of the bilinear system (2)
is the solution of the generalized Lyapunov equation (3) and
is defined by
P =
∞∑
q=1
∫ ∞
0
· · ·
∫ ∞
0
PqP
>
q dt1 · · · dtq, (4)
where
PqP
>
q = e
N0tq
∑
k∈Ea
NkPq−1P>q−1N
>
k e
N>0 tq , (5)
for q > 1, and
P1P
>
1 = e
N0t1BB>eN
>
0 t1 . (6)
B. Supermodularity of the H2 Norm
Our objective is to characterize the H2 norm of the bilinear
system as a function of which edges are under attack. For
the main theoretical result of this paper, consider a family of
bilinear digraphs F generated by the ground set of vulnerable
edges Ev , and ∀Ea ∈ 2Ev and let Σ(Ea) be the bilinear system
induced by the corresponding bilinear digraph as in equation
(2). We can, then, define the square of the H2 norm as a
discrete function ρΣ(Ea) : 2Ev → R+ as
ρΣ(Ea) = ||Σ(Ea)||22, ∀Ea ∈ 2Ev . (7)
With such definition consider the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Suppose that for family of bilinear digraphs F
Assumption 1 holds for everyone of its elements, then the
square of the H2 norm function ρΣ(Ea) : 2Ev → R+ is
properly defined, monotonic and supermodular.
Proof. The proper definition of the H2 norm function is a
direct consequence of every element of F respecting As-
sumption 1. For monotonicity and supermodularity, consider
the Gramian matrix P as defined in equation (4). For clarity
of the proof assume the system has a single node attacked
by an additive disturbance Va = {ik1} for some ik1 ∈ V .
This result is still valid for multiple additive disturbances on
different nodes, such case will be discussed in a following
remark. Define the matrix eN0t = EN0(t) =
(
eijN0(t)
)
ij
and notice that for any square matrix matrix M ∈ Rn×n
and elementary matrix Ei0j0 , Ei0j0ME
>
i0j0
= mj0j0Ei0i0 and
MEi0j0M
> =
(
mii0mjj0
)
ij
. Then, rewriting equation (6)
results in
P1P
>
1 = EN0(t1)eik1 e
>
ik1
E>N0(t1) =
(
e
iik1
N0
(t1)e
jik1
N0
(t1)
)
ij
,
and computing the next iteration gives
P2P
>
2 =
∑
k2∈Ea
(
e
jk2 ik1
N0
(t1)
)2 (
e
iik2
N0
(t2)e
jik2
N0
(t2)
)
ij
, (8)
and for the next iteration based on (5), we have
P3P
>
3 =∑
k3∈Ea
∑
k2∈Ea
(
e
jk2 ik1
N0
(t1)
)2
×
(
e
jk3 ik2
N0
(t2)
)2 (
e
iik3
N0
(t3)e
jik3
N0
(t3)
)
ij
.
(9)
From equations (8) and (9) we can easily verify by induction
that the general term of equation (5) becomes as follows:
PqP
>
q =∑
kq∈Ea
· · ·
∑
k2∈Ea
(
q−1∏
`=1
(
e
jk`+1 ik`
N0
(t`)
)2)(
e
iikq
N0
(tq)e
jikq
N0
(tq)
)
ij
.
(10)
Similarly, the trace of the Gramian can be computed as
trace(P ) =
∑∞
q=1
∫∞
0
· · · ∫∞
0
trace(PqP
>
q )dt1 · · · dtq . Defin-
ing as Tq(Ea) the value of trace(PqP>q ) computed for Σ(Ea),
we can compute its general form from (10) as
Tq(Ea) = trace
(
PqP
>
q
)
=∑
kq∈Ea
· · ·
∑
k2∈Ea
(
q−1∏
`=1
(
e
jk`+1 ik`
N0
(t`)
)2) n∑
k¯=1
(
e
k¯ikq
N0
(tq)
)2
.
(11)
From equation (11) we can immediately conclude the H2
norm function as we defined is monotonic, since increasing
the number of attacked edges increases the number of terms
in the iterated sum, which are always non-negative due to the
square in them.
To prove supermodularity we need to show that for two sets
of attacked edges A,B ∈ 2Ev with A ⊂ B and for some edge
e /∈ B the following inequality holds
ρΣ(B ∪ e)− ρΣ(B) ≥ ρΣ(A ∪ e)− ρΣ(A). (12)
To show (12), A being a set of attacked edges, and defining
the isomorphism h such that h(N≤m) = A and that for some
r ∈ N, r > m, h(r) = e (that is, the attacked edges are
properly numbered from 1 to m and the new edge to be
attacked is the r − th one), then we can check that
Tq(A ∪ e) = Tq(A) + Tq(e)
+
m∑
kq−1,...,k2=1
q−1∏
`=1
(
e
jk`+1
ik`
N0
(t`)
)2 n∑
k¯=1
(
e
k¯ikq
N0
(tq)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣
kq=r
+
m∑
kq,kq−2,...,k2=1
q−1∏
`=1
(
e
jk`+1
ik`
N0
(t`)
)2 n∑
k¯=1
(
e
k¯ikq
N0
(tq)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣
kq−1=r
+ · · ·
+
m∑
kq,...,k3=1
q−1∏
`=1
(
e
jk`+1
ik`
N0
(t`)
)2 n∑
k¯=1
(
e
k¯ikq
N0
(tq)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣
k2=r
+
m∑
kq−2,...,k2=1
q−1∏
`=1
(
e
jk`+1
ik`
N0
(t`)
)2 n∑
k¯=1
(
e
k¯ikq
N0
(tq)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣
kq,kq−1=r
+ · · ·
+
m∑
kq,...,k4=1
q−1∏
`=1
(
e
jk`+1
ik`
N0
(t`)
)2 n∑
k¯=1
(
e
k¯ikq
N0
(tq)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣
k3,k2=r
+ · · ·
+
m∑
k2=1
q−1∏
`=1
(
e
jk`+1
ik`
N0
(t`)
)2 n∑
k¯=1
(
e
k¯ikq
N0
(tq)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣
kq,...,k3=r
+ · · ·
+
m∑
kq=1
q−1∏
`=1
(
e
jk`+1
ik`
N0
(t`)
)2 n∑
k¯=1
(
e
k¯ikq
N0
(tq)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣
kq−1,...,k2=r
,
(13)
which allows us to easily evaluate the inequality (12) by
comparing the individual mixed terms for two different sets
of attacked edges A,B ∈ 2Eva , A ⊂ B. Notice that for com-
pactness we represented the iterated sum
∑m
kq=1
· · ·∑mk2=1 as∑m
kq,...,k2=1
.
Defining, without loss of generality, that A = h(N≤m1),
and B = h(N≤m2), m1 < m2 < r. Then we can write, for
example, the last term of Tq(B ∪ e)− Tq(B) as
m1∑
kq=1
q−1∏
`=1
(
e
jk`+1
ik`
N0
(t`)
)2 n∑
k¯=1
(
e
k¯ikq
N0
(tq)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣
kq−1,...,k2=r
+
m2∑
kq=m1+1
q−1∏
`=1
(
e
jk`+1
ik`
N0
(t`)
)2 n∑
k¯=1
(
e
k¯ikq
N0
(tq)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣
kq−1,...,k2=r
,
which clearly contains the last term of T (A∪ e)−T (A) plus
(m2 −m1) non-negative terms. It is easily verifiable that this
is true for everyone of the mixed terms in (13), which shows
that the inequality in equation (12) holds ∀A,B ∈ 2Eva , A ⊂ B,
proving the supermodularity of ρΣ(·).
Remark. For a bilinear system with multiple additive distur-
bances it is easy to verify that the only change would appear
on the terms computed in P1P>1 which appear in the general
term PqP>q as the element in the iterated product for ` = 1.
For this case of multiple attacked nodes it is enough to write
the iterated product from ` = 2 to q−1 and add the appropriate
element of the matrix resulting from P1P>1 separately, which
would still be squared and, therefore, non-negative. This means
that all the terms of the mixed terms in equation (13) are still
non-negative and therefore the supermodularity still holds.
IV. ATTACK OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
A. Problem Formulation
While the H2 norm of the system is a good metric for
robustness, it is generally not viable to test every possible
subset of the vulnerable edges to determine the best attack
strategy. To effectively find this solution, we formulate our
edge selection problem for a bilinear network as selecting
some links Ea from candidates Ev and attacking them via
η such that we maximise the effect of the disturbances on
system (2). In this work, we assume the nodes attacked by
additive disturbances are fixed beforehand and, therefore, the
input matrix B does not change for any element in the search
domain of the attacked edge selection problem. Consider, then,
the following utility function for attacking the system
Φ(Ea) = ρΣ(Ea)− F (|Ea|),
where ρΣ(Ea) is given by (7), and F (|Ea|) is the cost as-
sociated with attacking more links and is assumed to be an
increasing function of the number of attacked links (this can be
interpreted as energy cost, risk of detection, or other relevant
metric depending on the specific problem). In this work, we
assume a simple linear function F (|Ea|) = b|Ea|, for some
b ∈ R++.2
We formally define our attack problem as follows:
Definition. Consider a family of bilinear digraphs F gen-
erated by the ground set of vulnerable edges Ev and its
associated bilinear systems. The problem of finding the optimal
set of edges to attack Ea can be stated as
max
Ea⊂Ev
Φ(Ea), (14)
Which is the maximization of an unconstrained supermodular
function.
We then use the following theorem later in our algorithm
to find a solution for problem (14).
Theorem 3 ( [19]). The problem minEa⊂Ev Φˆ(Ev) can be
solved in time poly(N), for any submodular function Φˆ : 2Ea →
R.
Our problem can easily fit this structure by defining
Φˆ(Ea) = −Φ(Ea) and several algorithms are present in
the literature to solve it. In [20], for example, the authors
present the elipsoid method which solves the problem in weak
polynomial time.
B. Simulations
To illustrate the effect of disturbances on bilinear systems
we consider a ring digraph with 5 nodes and negative self
loops on each node as presented in Fig. 1.
2If we relax the linearity assumption from F (|Ea|) to submodularity, then
Φ(·) is still supermodular, since ρΣ(·) and −F (·) are as well.
Fig. 1. This graph depicts a ring digraph with five nodes. Notice that each
node has a negative self loop and the edge from node five to node one is also
negative, both this conditions are necessary to enforce stability of the drift
matrix for this structure.
Fig. 2. Values of ρΣ(·) of the ring graph for every possible set of attacked
edges. The lighter cells represent a larger value of ρΣ(·)
As shown in Fig. 1, we label the nodes from one to five,
where node one is the only that suffers an additive attack v
(i.e., B = [1; 0; 0; 0; 0]). We also label the edges that are not
self loops according to their tail ends (e.g. edge one is from
node one to node two, edge two from node two to node three
and so forth).
With this setup we can easily compute the ρΣ function of
the system for any subset of attacked edges and represent them
in Fig. 2. Notice from the figure that for this graph structure
some edges have a greater effect on the norm than others, this
happens because of the additive disturbance acting on node
one and does not change when the negative edge on the drift
matrix is changed (from edge five to edge one, two, or any
other that is not a self-loop).
From these results on this graph structure one can see that
edge one is the most sensitive to attacks, and if we consider
the sets of attacked edges excluding edge one, one can easily
see that for the same number of attacked edges, the maximum
norm is much smaller.
This conclusion is easy to reach in a system where all
the possible options can be computed and compared, but for
larger networks such analysis might be impractical. For these
cases the attack strategy proposed in this paper provides an
alternative to the brute force analysis.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper we showed that under appropriate stability
conditions the H2 norm of a bilinear system is supermodular
on the set of all possible attacked edges. We then showed how
we can use this property to find the the worst case attacks on
a bilinear network, giving insight as to which of its edges are
more sensible to attacks.
The optimization problem formulated in this paper give
useful insights to the design of bilinear networks and can help
to build a structure that disperses the sensitivity of the system
among the vulnerable edges, making it more robust not only
to attacks but to disturbances in general.
The theoretical results of this paper can also be extended in
future works to the observability Gramian of the system, con-
sidering how the actuated edges affect the cost of observability
while keeping the H2-norm as small as possible.
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